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Have regional development policies mitigated capital area population 
concentration in Korea?  This paper empirically examines the effects 
of central and local government investments in regional development 
policies in Korea, confirming that such investments have played a 
critical role in reducing provincial migration over the last two decades.  
This outcome is based on assessments of the performance of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers and central government investment 
in regional policies.  The present study therefore argues for the 
importance of considering and assessing not only the market effects but 
also the government effects when devising a redistributive policy 
agenda.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the effects of intergovernmental fiscal grants and 
regional policies on net migration on jurisdictions in Korea.  The idea for 
this research originated in the hypothesis that there might be some linkage 
between the huge amount of intergovernmental fiscal transfers that have been 
carried out and the decreasing trend of net migration from non-capital areas 
to the capital area over the last few decades.  Internal migration may play a 
self-equilibrating role in reducing regional disparities.
1)
  According to the 
OECD (2005), the decline in inter-regional migration observed in many 
countries since the 1970s seems to have halted in most cases, which gross 
flows even increasing in some countries.  The propensity to migrate is much 
higher among the highly skilled, implying that the low skilled are more 
dependent on local employment opportunities.  This analysis is based on the 
results of the market force effect.  This paper asserts that non-market forces 
like intergovernmental grants to poorer areas, regional policy regulations and 
tax support policies, and the introduction of new educational infrastructure 
among others have played major roles in facilitating the decline of 
inter-regional migration.  
Theoretically, one of the purposes of intergovernmental grants to poor 
jurisdictions is to facilitate population redistribution.  Residents of recipient 
areas are able to remain there with the financial support provided to improve 
infrastructure, environment, etc.  The green bars in figure 1 indicate the net 
migration among all jurisdictions.  Net migration itself has been on a 
decreasing trend since the 1990s.  As well, the number of people who have 
moved into the capital area, represented in figure 1 by the blue dots, has 
reduced.  There are several possible reasons for this such as income effects 
and the impact of governmental efforts to decrease the net number of people 
migrating to the capital area.  Harris-Todaro (1970) asserts a migration 
theory based on the relationship between economic maturity and migration 
pattern.  Brueckner and Kim (2001) question whether migration can be explained 
                                                          
1) OECD (2005), p. 75. 
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Figure 1 Population Movement in Seoul Metropolitan Area 
(unit: people) 
 
Source: Statistics Korea. 2012. ―Population Movement in Seoul Metropolitan Area in the Last 
10 years,‖ In 2012 Statistics on Domestic Population Movement.  
 
by the equalization of expected wages between city and countryside.  This 
theory may overlook another important equilibrating force: the 
migration-induced rise in the urban cost of living, which occurs principally 
through escalation of urban land rents as the city population expands.  That 
is, escalated land rents tend to limit rural-urban migration, thus providing an 
important additional force in terms of controlling urban populations. 
Migration equilibrium, therefore, can in some aspects be traced back to 
market forces like rising land rents, increases in formal sector jobs, etc.  The 
economic model focuses on market-induced migration.  
However, the economics-based migration model overlooks the role of 
government policy — like regional development policies, for example — in 
mitigating market-induced migration.  Of course, intergovernmental grants 
transferred from the central to local governments have a redistributive 
purpose: put bluntly, they provide to poorer areas the funds they need to 
improve standards of living and infrastructure for their residents, thereby 
curbing the tendency toward migration.  Such grants may in fact play the 
strongest role in spreading out the population as in figure 2.  In Korea, the 
fiscal size of intergovernmental grants has been growing yearly.  Korea has 
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Figure 2 Ratio of Grants to GDP in Korea 
(unit: %) 
 
Source: Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, Statistical Year Book 
(yearly). 
 
Figure 3 Ratio of Fiscal Transfer to Total Government Expenditure 
(2005) 
Source: Blöchliger and Petzold (2009), p. 32, Figure 9. 
 
the highest absolute size of transfers among OECD countries in figure 3, and 
the reasons for this require empirical analysis.  This paper therefore 
examines the performance of regional policy in terms of intergovernmental 
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grants provided to local governments and the role of such grants in reducing 
the net migration rate to the capital area. 
 
1.1. The Story of the Concentration and Fiscal Decentralization  
 
In 2008, 49.5 percent of the entire population of South Korea resided in its 
capital city, Seoul, making it the most densely populated city among OECD 
countries.  Figure 4 shows the comparison of the ratio of the Metropolitan 
concentration in OECD countries.  A fundamental reason for the intense 
population concentration in the capital area is that Seoul has been, 
historically, the heart of economic activity in Korea.  The country achieved 
rapid economic development from the 1960s to the 1980s, a time period 
known as ‗The Miracle of the Han River‘.2)  However, a side effect of such 
accelerated development was asymmetric regional development, with the 
discrepancy between the regional economic capacity of the capital area 
and other areas expanding from the1970s to 2000s.  The population 
concentration in the capital has only served to exacerbate this fiscal 
imbalance. 
In 1975, the number of people who had migrated to the capital stood at 
641,000, a number that continued to increase until 1990.  After 1990 people 
living in Seoul started to move to nearby areas, with 322,000 people moving 
out of the capital in 1995.  Kyung-ki Province, located closest to Seoul, 
housed 373,000 Seoul emigrants in 1995.  Surprisingly, even after 2000 
when land prices were exploding, migration to the capital area began 
increasing again.  
The concentration of population in metropolitan areas causes a multitude 
of social and economic problems, with raised housing costs, increased crime 
rates, and expanded urban sprawl to name just a few.  Aware of this, the 
central government in Korea has made significant fiscal transfers to the rural 
sector to curb what is commonly referred to as ‗fiscally-induced migration‘. 
In 2009, the size of the Korean government‘s fiscal transfer to rural areas was 
                                                          
2) Kim (2014). 
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Figure 4 Ratio of Metropolitan Area Population Concentration 
in OECD Countries (2008) 
(unit: %) 
Source: OECD Metropolitan Areas Database (2009). 
  
Figure 5 Ratio of Intergovernmental Transfer to GDP (2011) 
(unit: %) 
Source: See Appendix for source details. 
 
the highest among OECD countries (9.2 percent of GDP).  Figure 5 shows 
the size of the intergovernmental transfer to GDP. 
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Another force behind such population concentration in Korea can be found 
in the country‘s history of ‗local autonomy‘, which began in Korea in 1991 
with local elections for local councils, and expanded to elections for 
provincial governors and mayors in 1995.  Local elections provide more 
incentive for local representatives to work for the public good since they are 
more concerned about their performance, especially if they desire reelection.  
In other words, the public can make their demands heard through their votes, 
which pushes local representatives to respond to such demands.  Kim 
(2007) found a significant relationship between the results of re-election and 
the size of local expenditure.  
Political, global, and fiscal trends in Korea at present have necessitated the 
expansion of the role of local governments.  The fiscal transfer from the 
central government to local governments, referred to as ‗intergovernmental 
fiscal grants‘, was considerable among OECD countries in 2005 (see figure 
2).  At that time the fiscal size of local governments was larger, and the 
expansion of local revenue and expenditures was deemed acceptable in light 
of political, global, and fiscal trends.  Local taxes and expenditures have 
been the most controversial issues in terms of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in Korea.  In reality, local expenditure through intergovernmental 
transfer has steadily grown over the last decade.  Figure 3 shows that the 
transfer size to total government expenditure was highest among the OECD 
member countries in 2005.  The fiscal imbalance among jurisdictions 
indicates a discrepancy between local taxes and local expenditure. 
Former administrations have made various attempts to solve this problem, 
including urbanizing once blighted areas through the construction of 
infrastructure to increase employment and education opportunities in those 
areas (e.g., the development of Sejong City as well as various ‗innovative 
cities‘, ‗enterprise cities‘, etc.).  The Roh administration in 2005 introduced 
the ‗Balanced Regional Development Policy‘ to enhance regional economic 
capacity and made related laws and committees to support the policy‘s 
initiatives.  Indeed, ‗balanced regional development‘ was a top priority 
under Roh, who made the controversial decision to move main government 
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offices from Seoul to another province.  The decision definitely had its 
opponents, but as of 2014 almost all ministries had relocated to the new 
administrative city of Sejong.  Other diverse policies for balanced regional 
development are under consideration by the central government now, with 
the hope that such policies will finally result in an even distribution of the 
Korean population.  
 
1.2. Internal Migration in Korea and Literature Review 
 
Statistics Korea analyzes the main cause of population increase in any 
given region as employment, and the main causes of decrease as housing 
shortages and family affairs.  Together these three factors account for 83 
percent of all demographic movements in Korea, while transportation, 
culture, the availability of amenities and convenience facilities, healthcare, 
and residential/natural environments account for less than 20 percent.  
People in their 20s comprise the most mobile age group, though the mobility 
rate of 25 to 29 year olds decreased by more than 7 percentage points 
between 2003 and 2013. 
 
Figure 6 Demographic Movements of Different Age Groups, 2003-2013 
Source: Statistics Korea, Demographic Movement Statistics 2013, 2013 (figure 2). 
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This pattern is nothing unique to Korea; it is also observed in both the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  Migration researchers assert that 
the onset of the latest global economic crisis increased the rigidity of job 
markets worldwide, lessening inter-regional migration on the whole.  Some 
studies on migration patterns in the United States find the cause for reduced 
migration in the increasing volatility of housing prices.
3)
  The migration rate 
in the United States is higher than that of Europe due to the greater instability 
of the American job market.  This may indicate that the European job 
market is relatively more settled and/or that Europeans tend to stay in the 
same jobs for much longer than Americans.
4)
  Bonin et al. (2008) provide 
an empirical analysis demonstrating the significant correlation between the 
migration rate in a given society and the frequency of job changes over one‘s 
lifetime in that society.  Other studies show that the United States is almost 
the only exception, showing a decline in the inter-regional migration rate; 
that the migration rates in Denmark, Hungary, and Finland are consistently 
higher than those in the United States; that the migration rate across Europe 
was relatively high in the first several years of the 21st century; that the 
inter-provincial migration rate in Canada is lower than the inter-state 
migration rate in the United States, and so forth.
5)
 
These studies confirm that, aside from the impact of the latest global 
economic crisis, the high percentage of people in their 20s in a given 
population and the flexibility of a job market are reliable indicators of high 
migration rates.  Like the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, Korea 
today is also receiving an increasing number of immigrants from overseas.  
These studies show that the major causes of migration include changes in the 
macroeconomic environment and their impact on the job market and local or 
regional conditions.  In other words, they explain much about migration in 
terms of the market effect.  
                                                          
3) Molloy et al. (2011), pp. 175, 192. 
4) Oswald (1999). 
5) ―...higher migration rates in the United States may indicate lower frictions in the labor 
market as compared to Europe.  Thus, lower migration rates might signal an increase in 
labor market frictions, although the direction of causality is not clear....‖ (Molloy et al., 
2011, p. 194).  
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However, this paper focuses on the fiscal policy effect that contributes to 
or causes migration.  More specifically, I attempt to determine whether and 
what kinds of fiscal policy measures can induce increases or decreases in the 
population of a given region.  Analyses adopting this approach mostly focus 
on specific cases, such as Canada, with its sizable amount of fiscal 
equalization resources, and Sweden, with local governments possessing 
significant degrees of fiscal responsibility for meting out social and welfare 
services.  In adopting the fiscal policy approach, we must keep in mind that 
no simple comparisons can be made among countries with significantly 
different sizes of populations, national territories, or labor market conditions.  
For instance, Molloy et al. (2011), in a study on the high migration rate in the 
United States, conclude that countries such as the United States need not 
invest a large amount of fiscal resources in public and social services, as the 
population holds little expectations of such services.  Such a conclusion, 
however, is excessively focused on the superficial phenomenon of migration 
patterns, without exploring more deeply what such patterns may imply for 
the current state of welfare services. 
Moreover, the high migration rate in the United States may be more a 
result of certain exceptional characteristics of the country — e.g., the 
continued influx of immigrants from overseas, the sustained economic 
growth, the ethnic diversity of the population, and the vastness of national 
territories — than a universal phenomenon.  It may hold little applicability 
to European countries or Korea where balanced national development is an 
essential part of the national policy agenda.  Canada, occupying the other 
half of North America, implements a fiscal policy strikingly different from 
the American one, and thus it is much more familiar with the concept of 
fiscally induced migration. 
The empirical analysis in this section strives to verify whether there is any 
significant causal correlation between the steady decline in the migration rate 
in Korea and fiscal policy.  While there can be multiple factors or causes of 
decline in migration — such as the rise in income level, the economic 
recession, the growing instability of housing prices, and the aging population 
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— our concern is to determine the extent of the role of fiscal support policies 
for local governments and regional development in the phenomenon.  From 
the redistribution perspective, the goal of intergovernmental fiscal 
coordination is to provide social and public services in a given 
underdeveloped region to make it more rational for residents to stay in that 
region and maintain a certain quality of life than move in search of jobs and 
pay the high cost of migration.  Our empirical analysis therefore starts from 
the hypothesis that Korea‘s current intergovernmental fiscal coordination 
system, underpinned by local revenue sharing and subsidies from the central 
government, has in fact contributed to the drop in the country‘s inter-regional 
migration rate.  There have been several empirical studies about the 
relationship between local expenditures and economic growth.  Kim (2005) 
shows strong empirical evidence that local government expenditures increase 
both the number of establishments and the output per firm in the 
manufacturing sector.  Kim (2007) also found the linkage between the 
intergovernmental grants and the regional income. 
 
 
2. DATA AND MODEL 
 
2.1. Stable Decrease in Regional Migration Rate in Korea  
 
According to Statistics Korea, overall regional (inter-province and 
intra-province) migration decreased to 19.1 percent of the total population in 
2006, while the share of intra-province migration stood at 67.3 percent. 
Population movement into the Seoul metropolitan area also decreased 6.0 
percentage points compared to the previous year.  As in other countries, 
there was more intra-province migration and less inter-province migration.  
There has been evolved as stable decrease in regional migration rate in Korea 
but still higher than other countries.  
The decline in migration rate can be attributed to market force effects such 
as income growth, the expansion of the aging population, and unstable economic 
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Figure 7 Ratio of the 2005 Population that Moved in 2004 
Sources: European data, Eurobarometer 64.1, distributed as ICPSR No.4641.  US data, 2005. 
Current Population Survey (2005).  Molloy et al. (2011, p. 193, figure 5). 
 
Table 1 Comparison of Internal Migration in Korea, the United States, 
and Japan 
Migration 
Range 
 
 
Year 
KOREA USA JAPAN 
Total 
Migra- 
tion 
Cities 
and 
Districts 
Counties 
and  
States 
Total 
Migration 
Counties States 
Total 
Migration 
Counties 
and States 
2001 19.4 12.7 6.1 13.5 5.6 2.8 4.9 2.2 
2002 19.9 12.4 6.2 14.2 5.7 2.8 4.7 2.2 
2003 19.7 12.4 6.2 13.7 5.4 2.7 4.7 2.1 
2004 17.7 11.2 5.8 13.3 5.3 2.6 4.6 2.1 
2005 18.1 11.3 5.8 13.2 5.3 2.6 4.4 2.1 
2006 19.1 11.9 6.0 13.3 4.7 2.0 4.4 2.1 
2007 18.5 11.6 5.9 12.8 4.2 1.7 4.4 2.1 
2008 17.8 11.1 5.7 11.5 3.7 1.6 4.3 2.0 
2009 17.1 10.7 5.5 12.1 3.7 1.6 4.2 2.0 
2010 16.5 10.3 5.3 12.2 3.5 1.4 4.0 2.0 
2011 16.2 9.9 5.2 11.3 3.5 1.6 4.0 1.9 
2012 14.9 9.9 5.0 – – – – – 
Sources: Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2011.  Japan Statistics Bureau, Report 
on Internal Migration in Japan, 2012.  Statistics Korea, 2012 Annual Report on 
Internal Migration Statistics (2012, p. 3). 
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fundamentals.  As mentioned earlier, this paper hypothesizes that 
institutional effects may have also contributed to shrinking the gap between 
capital and non-capital areas.  For example, intergovernmental fiscal grants 
have been essential to improving poorer areas in Korea over the last three 
decades.  Regional policies that include such regulations as putting a ceiling 
on the number of firms allowed to operate in Seoul have facilitated a 
reduction in migration to the capital area.  And yet, Korea‘s migration rate 
is still higher than other countries. 
Molloy et al. (2012) examined migration populations in various countries 
(excluding Korea) in previous years.  They found the highest mobility rate 
in Europe in Finland and Denmark, at around 14 percent, and the highest 
mobility rate of all countries in the United States.  Figure 7 shows the ratio 
of the 2005 population that moved in 2004.  Korea‘s migration rate, at 14.9 
percent, is still higher than other countries based on the given literature as in 
table 1. 
 
2.2. Model 
 
This study utilizes the analysis model developed by Mills et al. (1983), 
which has been applied in many other studies including Watson (1986), Kim 
and Jang (1997), and Kim (2008 and 2013).  The model assumes that 
individuals considering migration to other regions select the regions to which 
they will move based on a cost-benefit analysis, considering such items as 
expected income (I), the availability of public goods and services in the given 
locale (G), and the availability of housing (H).  The utility function for such 
individuals is therefore expressed as follows: 
 
( ,  ,  ),B B I G H                      (1) 
 
where ‗I‘ is determined on the basis of the average income level and the 
employment rate of the region being considered, and ‗G‘ includes both 
variables dependent on local government spending (e.g., availability of 
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waterworks and sewage facilities, roads, etc.) and variables dependent on 
central government spending (e.g., education).  As for public education, the 
central government provides much of the required resources, but individuals 
considering migration tend to perceive education as part of the public and 
social services available in the desired region, which is why it is included as 
part of ‗G‘.  This study treats the investment income in housing (‗H‘) as a 
separate variable.  Individuals considering migration will necessarily weigh 
the costs of possible choices.  The cost of residence (‗R‘) is comprised of 
such variables as the amount of monthly or yearly rent.  The ‗T‘ stands for 
the taxes or prices on the local public goods and services provided.  We can 
estimate the net benefits and costs for an individual considering migration 
using the following formulae: 
 
( ,  ),C C R T                        (2) 
 
Net Benefit = Benefit – Cost.                (3) 
 
An individual considering migration will also estimate the expected future 
benefits and costs of either staying at their current location (‗i‘) or moving to 
a new location (‗j‘) at a certain point of time in the future (‗t‘).  When net 
benefit is greater than zero ( [ ] 0),ijE NB   the individual will move from ‗i‘ 
to ‗j‘ according to equation (4).  Equation (5) shows the migration as 
functional form.  The linear equation (equation (6)) for estimating the 
migration function (equation (5)) is as follows:  
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]
( ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,   ,  ),
ij j i
i j i j i j i j i j
E NB E NB E NB
f EI EI G G H H R R T T
 
       
 (4) 
 
,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,
t t t t t t
j j j j j jt
ij t t t t t t
i i i i i i
EI ED RO RE LT HP
M F
EI ED RO RE LT HP
 
   
 
          (5) 
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1 2 3 4 5
6 7 .
j j j jt
ij
i i i i
j j
ij
i i
EI ED RO RE
M
EI ED RO RE
LT HP
LT HP
    
  
    
  
            (6) 
 
Let‘s now consider the models and anticipated signs underlying our 
hypotheses.  First, according to the classic theory of urban economics 
originating from the Harris-Todaro model (1970), an increase in expected 
income is the most important factor prompting migration.  When people 
decide to migrate based on the expectation of higher income, the sign in front 
of the coefficient will be 
2 0.    Second, the Boadway and Flatters model 
(1982) explains migration and population concentration as effects of fiscal 
policies.  The variables resulting from fiscal policies in this model include 
education, extended roads, capital expenditure, local taxes per capita, and 
transferred fiscal resources per capita.  We can assume that the signs 
attached to all these variables except local taxes per capita will be positive 
(+).  In this analysis, we equate local taxes per capita to the prices of public 
goods available at the migration destination. 
Third, Dusansky and Koc (2007) demonstrate that the greater the returns 
on investment, the greater the demand for house ownership.  The price of 
housing is seen as a return on investment, unlike the cost of residence.  Such 
returns in investment reflect the fiscal costs and benefits in large cities (i.e., 
tax revenue per capita subtracted by tax spending per capita).  Local taxes 
are not spent on metropolitan and regional transportation facilities, subway 
services, and environmental maintenance services in which the central 
government invests for the benefit of local communities.  The fiscal costs 
and benefits in various regions and communities resulting from national 
government-led policy projects shape and affect the living environments in 
these regions and communities (e.g., quality of schools, park services), and 
they are ultimately reflected in the prices of local real estate properties.  
Accordingly, the migration and concentration of populations in urban areas 
indicate that for the same amount of taxes they pay, taxpayers receive public 
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services of better quality (e.g., in Gangnam-gu, Gwacheon).  The quality of 
public services in these areas further serves to induce greater migration, 
exerting an upward pressure on local housing prices.  Therefore, we can 
assume 
7 0.    Finally, the Brueckner and Kim model (2001) helps us 
estimate the residential costs one will likely pay upon migrating to a large 
city (e.g., housing rents).  The sign attached to this variable therefore will be 
negative 
5( 0).   
 
2.3. Panel Data Set and Migration Variables 
 
The panel data is composed of 16 provincial regions covering 16 years 
from 1997 to 2012.
6)
  The migration data used in the estimation is derived 
from Statistics Korea.  Since there is one moving-out province to 15 
moving-in provinces each year, each year has 240 (=16*15) variables, 
bringing the total variables to 3,840 (=240*16).  The dependent variable is 
used in the estimation, and the rate of out-migration from region i to region j 
is calculated as the gross migration flow from i to j divided by the population 
of region of origin, i.  The independent variables are also normalized in this 
estimation, as the rate of in-migration to out-migration. 
 
,   , 1, ,  16,
ij
ij
i
GM
M i j
POP
   
 
where  ijM   the rate of out-migration from region i to j, 
     ijGM   the gross flow of migrants from region i to j, 
  
iP O P  the population of region i. 
 
The earnings variable employed in the estimation is an estimate of average 
yearly wages and salaries in each province.  The average wage in each 
region was weighted by the probability of obtaining employment in the 
                                                          
6) Because Ulsan was joined in 1997 as one of the authorities in Statistics, the starting year of the 
data in this analysis is the year of 1997. 
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region.  Both the earnings and unemployment rate data for these 
calculations were obtained from Statistics Korea, 1997 to 2012.  Second, 
the education variables, derived from the Ministry of Education statistics 
(YEAR), are the number of college students in each province.  Third, for the 
public provision variables, the total paved road ratio is used as stated in the 
Statistical Year Book (YEAR) of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Transportation.  Also, this analysis includes capital expenditure variables 
which denote the regional capital investment in each province.  Since 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers includes cash transfer and capital 
investment, estimations using simple transfer variables alone may not 
accurately reflect the regional investment.  
This study isolates capital expenditure variables from transfer variables in 
the estimation based on data coopted from the Statistical Year Book (YEARS 
needed here) of the Ministry of Government Administration and Home 
Affairs.  This analysis also shows the central government‘s effect on 
provincial migration using the variable of gross capital formation for the first 
time.  Even though there are several papers that show the effect of fiscal 
transfers on provincial migration and local economic growth, the impact of 
the central government‘s direct investment in provinces has, before now, 
never been probed in Korea‘s case.  The housing rent variable was derived 
from the Micro Public Panel Data Set of the KIPF.  According to 
Brueckner and Kim (2001), housing rents can be assumed as barriers to entry 
into the urban area.  The land price variable in this study is used to show the 
capitalization effect and represents the merits of residence amenities.  
Therefore, the expected impact of this variable is either positive. 
For the control variables, the rapid transit railway system, KTX (Korail), 
was also included in the estimation.  Much debate has surrounded whether 
the KTX affects internal migration or not.  Cash transfer expenditure is also 
controlled in this estimation.  Recently, subnational expenditure has 
significantly increased because of the broadened scope and cost of cash 
transfer-based projects.  For migration equilibrium, the concept of moving 
cost is included in the model as well.  The variable of the direct distance 
Hyun-A Kim 286 
from i to j province is used for the moving cost.  The distance between 
provinces is not ‗time invariant‘ since the city center — i.e., the location of 
city hall — has changed in some provinces. 
 
 
3. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
 
Basic estimating equations were set out in (6).  Each specification was 
estimated for each of 16 regions for the period from 1997 to 2012.  All 
variables were standardized as the rate of each variable.  For example, the 
expected income variable of Seoul (i) to Busan (j) migrants in 2008 was 
derived by dividing Seoul‘s expected income by Busan‘s expected income, 
1.1.  Therefore, as table 2 shows, the correlation among variables does not 
matter as much as the level variables.  This analysis was carried out using 
fixed effect and random effect methodology, and includes a number of controls 
which vary enough within provinces over time so as not to be captured by 
      
Table 2 Correlation Matrix of Standardized Variables 
 
Net 
Migration 
Education 
Expected 
Income 
Gross 
Capital 
Formation 
Capital 
Expendi- 
ture 
Land 
Prices 
Distance GRDP 
Local 
Tax 
Trans- 
fers 
Net 
Migration 
1.00 
         
Education 0.23 1.00 
        
Expected 
Income 
0.11 0.02 1.00 
       
Gross 
Capital 
Formation 
0.25 0.43 0.11 1.00 
      
Capital 
Expenditure 
0.29 0.34 0.08 0.88 1.00 
     
Land Prices 0.23 0.28 0.15 0.06 0.01 1.00 
    
Distance –0.41 0.08 –0.02 0.15 0.04 0.01 1.00 
   
GRDP 0.32 0.51 0.20 0.77 0.62 0.32 0.18 1.00 
  
Local Tax 0.27 0.21 0.41 0.15 0.16 0.45 0.05 0.39 1.00 
 
Transfers –0.06 –0.14 –0.11 –0.01 0.04 –0.13 0.02 –0.13 –0.28 1.00 
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fixed effects.  Since the variables are standardized as the rate of each 
variable, the degree of correlation among the variables would not be serious 
as expected.  Also, according to given literature, the stationarity tests such 
as unit root test and covariance test may not be considerable in this setup. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
From our empirical analysis we can surmise the relationship between the 
reduction of provincial migration rates and the huge investment of 
subnational governments.  Model 1 uses macro-data as the baseline of the 
estimation; Model 2 includes the KTX variable; and Model 3 uses 
micro-panel data from the KIPF for the variables of ‗local tax‘ and ‗rent 
deposit (see table 4)‘. 
The coefficients of capital expenditure and capital stock (gross capital 
formation) in the local budget are significantly positive.  This result implies 
that the higher the capital investment, the more migration at the provincial 
level.  Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and capital stock transfers by the 
central government are strongly redistributive.  The dominant share of such 
transfers is from richer provinces to poorer ones, and this policy tendency has 
helped facilitate infrastructure expansion and economic development in those 
areas and as result, decreased migration of residents out of those areas and 
into urban centers.  Thus moving costs have dropped as well.  From this 
result we can conclude that intergovernmental fiscal transfer and central 
government investment in underdeveloped areas hinder migration.  Capital 
expenditure and capital stock, both representing the amount of fiscal 
resources provided for local development, both retained a significance level 
of 1 percent as explicatory variables, thus confirming the hypothesis that an 
increase in capital expenditure by a given local government and in the 
amount of capital stock directly subsidized by the central government will 
translate — all things being equal — into an increase in the number of people 
migrating to the given region.  Capital expenditure includes spending not 
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Table 3 Hypothesis and Empirical Results 
 
Harris-Todaro 
(1970) 
Boadway and Flatters (1982) 
Brueckner 
and Kim 
(2001) 
Capital 
Gain 
Expected 
Income 
Education 
Capital Expenditure / 
Capital Stock 
Local 
Taxes 
Deposit / 
Housing 
Rent 
Land 
Price 
Hypothesis + + + – – + 
Results ? + + ? + + 
 
Table 4 Empirical Results 
Dep: Net Migration Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Expected Income 0.0006 (0.84) 0.0011 (0.29) –0.0012 (0.21) 
Number of College  
Students 
0.00001 (0.00)*** 0.0003 (0.03)** 0.0001 (0.00)*** 
Capital Expenditure 0.0004 (0.00)*** 0.0004 (0.00)*** 0.0004 (0.00)*** 
Capital Stock 0.0006 (0.00)*** 0.0006 (0.00)*** 0.0008 (0.00)*** 
Land Prices 0.0002 (0.00)*** 0.0002 (0.00)** 0.0001 (0.02)** 
Per Capita Local Tax 0.0020 (0.40) 0.0019 (0.11) –0.0017 (0.62) 
Number of  
KTX Users 
– –0.00001 (0.37) – 
Per Capita Welfare  
Expenditure 
– – –0.0001 (0.01)** 
Rent Deposit – – 0.0005 (0.00)*** 
Distance –0.0002 (0.00)*** –0.0003 (0.00)*** –0.0004 (0.00)*** 
Year –0.0005 (0.00)*** –0.0003 (0.00)*** –0.0001 (0.04)** 
Constants 0.1015 (0.01)** –0.62 (0.03)** –0.98 (0.02)** 
Methodology Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 
No. of Observations 3,810 946 596 
(Overall) R2 0.12 0.10 0.14 
Hausman Stat. 42.7 21.6 19.7 
Notes: The figures in parenthesis denote P-statistics.  *** means significance at the 1% level. 
** means significance at the 5% level.  And * means significance at the 10% level. 
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only on SOC development, but also on the creation of local facilities for 
culture, recreation, and social and welfare services.  It is therefore crucial 
for future research to clarify and explain the exact nature of the correlation 
between fiscal efficiency (in expanding capital facilities) and the 
competitiveness of a given region in relation to migration.  As massive 
public investments in SOC development have also been found to induce 
migration, we should analyze the exact impact of capital stock in ensuring 
balanced development.  Total road networks, standing in for SOC 
development, also exerted an impact on migration of all types. 
The correlation coefficients between variables align with those found in 
existing literature (e.g., Kim (2008) and Kim (2013)), with the exception of 
‗expected income‘.  According to traditional migration theory, the most 
powerful incentive of provincial migration is the expectation of income 
growth.  In the case of Korea, this hypothesis was confirmed in Kim (2013).  
However, the present analysis does not support income growth as an 
incentive for provincial migration.  In other words, the coefficient of 
expected income is not statistically significant in this study, straying from 
both existing literature and intuition.  The insignificance of the income 
effect may be explained in two ways.  The first is related to the age of the 
migration population, which has seen a dramatic shift in recent years.  In the 
past, most migrants between provinces were in their twenties, but these days 
their share has continuously decreased.  The second is related to the fact that 
the income discrepancy between provinces has been rendered meaningless 
since the unemployment rate of those in their twenties is now the highest in 
Korea‘s history.  Thus the expected income effect in the Seoul metropolitan 
area is no longer attractive enough to spur migration to the urban center 
among this age group. 
This analysis also reveals Korea‘s patterns of fiscal federalism.  Unlike 
other countries, Korea applies a uniform tax rate across all provinces.  Since 
the tax rate and tax bases are determined by the National Assembly, local 
governments have no taxing authority.  However, local governments are 
granted partial autonomy in the flexible adjustment of local tax rates.  But 
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as such tax rates are not applied on the entry price of public goods in each 
province, the coefficient of local tax might be insignificant.  Our results 
show the coefficient of housing deposit and rent as significantly positive, 
differing from Brueckner and Kim (2001).  This means that housing rents 
may not represent the cost of living in the urban area.  In contrast, housing 
rents in specific provinces may still represent the opportunity of capital 
improvement and be indicators of better education environments.  The 
significant positive correlation of housing rent implies that migrants are 
willing to pay higher rents when the targeted province promises better 
education facilities, etc.  As a result, monthly housing rent may be the proxy 
of land prices in Korea.  A key aspect of this empirical analysis is the 
isolation of the fiscal effect from the market effect (e.g., economic crises).  
The analysis attempts to capture unstable economic trends by variable and 
year. 
Additional findings are as follows.  First, the number of students in 
colleges etc. acted as a significant factor in migration.  Standing in for the 
educational environment of a given region, the number of students in 
colleges etc., along with other education-related variables such as educational 
spending, exerted a great impact on migration. 
Second, the KTX effect failed to serve as an adequate explicatory variable, 
when analyzed separately or jointly as part of capital expenditure.  Because 
the KTX effect was analyzed for the years after 2004, there were only 946 
samples subjected to analysis.  No ‗straw effect‘ was found in this analysis 
framework, as there appeared to be no KTX effect on migration. 
Third, the ‗year‘ variable controlling for the annual decline in the 
migration rate and the distance between two given regions also explained the 
downward trend in inter-regional migration in Korea.  That is, the greater 
the linear distance between two given regions, the less the inclination to 
migrate.  The linear distance variable is time-invariant and therefore should 
be properly excluded from the fixed effect analysis.  This study, however, 
included the variable in the fixed effect model in order to control the cost of 
migration.  
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Finally, educational conditions and official land value, which are variables 
of the market effect, are two decisive factors that clearly and significantly 
impact migration.  Furthermore, the presence of SOC-like infrastructure 
(effect of public policy) and the increase in capital expenditure (i.e., fiscal 
spending) also exert a demonstrable impact on migration. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Has regional policy mitigated population concentration in the capital area 
in Korea?  Our empirical analysis confirms that regional capital investment 
by the central and local governments has played a critical role in reducing 
provincial migration over the last two decades.  This study therefore 
encourages policymakers to look beyond just market effects and consider the 
government investment effect in the course of devising redistributive 
regional policies.  
This study contributes to the field by taking a unique approach to the 
migration issue, determining the net migration effect by isolating market 
forces such as employment, marriage education, etc., and showing the 
linkage between central and local governments‘ capital investment in 
underdeveloped areas and the reduction of migration rates.  In this way it 
opens up a new dimension in the redistributive policy agenda.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 Local Debt and Fiscal Decentralization in OECD Countries   
 
 
General Government 
Expenditure as a 
Percentage of GDP 
Intergovernmental 
Transfer Revenue as 
a Percentage of 
GDP 
Tax Burden 
Ratio 
to GDP 
Total Tax  
Revenue 
Central Local Central Local 
Austria 26.1 17.0 7.2 30.06 93.3 6.7 
Belgium 30.3 22.2 7.5 29.79 84.5 15.5 
Germany 14.4 20.7 4.5 22.83 52.3 47.7 
Switzerland 10.9 20.8 6.7 21.50 47.9 52.1 
United States 26.3 19.2 6.1 19.39 53.0 47.0 
Canada 14.7 18.3 
 
28.14 45.6 54.4 
Federal (average) 20.5 19.7 6.4 25.29 62.8 37.2 
Czech Republic 29.5 11.4 4 19.82 97.8 2.2 
Denmark 42.3 37.2 
 
47.06 72.5 27.5 
Estonia 28.7 9.7 
 
27.03 83.8 16.2 
Finland 27.4 22.6 5.5 30.91 67.3 32.7 
France 22.3 11.7 4 20.31 71.5 28.5 
Hungary 33.8 11.5 6.4 23.64 89.9 10.1 
Iceland 36.1 13.4 
 
35.96 73.6 26.4 
Ireland 40.9 5.8 4.3 22.62 100.0 0.0 
Israel 38.5 6.1 
 
27.02 91.2 8.8 
Italy 28.1 15.3 7.8 29.51 76.9 23.1 
Japan 19.7 16.4 2.5 16.67 56.6 43.4 
Korea 20.1 13.0 9.2 19.78 78.6 21.4 
Luxembourg 29.9 5.4 2.3 26.39 93.4 6.6 
Netherlands 28.9 16.5 5.3 
   
Norway 35.2 14.8 4.7 43.23 87.8 12.2 
Poland 24.9 14.1 
    
Portugal 36.3 7.0 3.2 
   
Slovak Republic 22.4 6.6 
 
16.75 95.1 4.9 
Slovenia 32.7 9.7 
 
21.96 81.7 18.3 
Spain 17.1 24.6 8 19.91 48.3 51.7 
Sweden 29.1 25.2 5.2 38.88 59.2 40.8 
United Kingdom 44.8 13.2 8.8 28.81 94.0 6.0 
Unitary (average) 30.4 14.1 5.4 27.17 80.0 20.0 
Sources: 1) Data for ‗General government expenditure as a percentage of GDP‘, ‗Tax burden 
ratio to GDP‘, and ‗Total tax revenue‘ are based on the OECD National Accounts 
(OECD Stat. comparative tables http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode= 
REV).  The data for Korea is based on the Outline of the Local Government Budget 
(2011), and for Japan is based on the 国民経済計算確報 (2011).  2) Data for 
‗Local government‘ includes state and local government.  3) Data for social security 
funds is excluded from the tax burden ratio.  Data for ‗Intergovernmental transfer 
revenue as percentage of GDP‘ was measured in 2006. 
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